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Abstract. This paper describes some of the problems intrinsic to intelligence analysis. The description 
derives from a close reading of the unclassified document “Khamisiyah: A Historical Perspective on 
Related Intelligence” (9 April 1997) which was prepared by a United States (US) Intelligence Community 
(IC) Persian Gulf War Illnesses Task Force authorized by the Acting Director of Central Intelligence, 
George J.Tenet, and directed by his Special Assistant for Gulf War Veterans’ Illnesses, Robert Walpole. 
 
No one gets it right all the time. But when it’s gotten wrong, psychological phenomena are induced 
within inquiring minds, the mindful, even the mindless as if everyone should get it right all the time. 
Some of these psychological phenomena involve intentional mischief--to sabotage and advance careers, 
political parties, governments, ideologies, and legislation or to promulgate viewpoints which will make it 
into today’s news or tomorrow’s history books. But other phenomena reflect a genuine 
misunderstanding of some aspects of intelligence analysis. 
 
For example, was information that there were Iraqi chemical warfare assets stored at Khamisiyah clearly 
available to some US intelligence analysts? Were they aware of this information? How did they interpret 
it? When were they aware of the information and their interpretations? What was done with their 
interpretations? 
 
These questions are significant--at least to people concerned with the diagnosis, etiology, course, 
treatment, and prognosis of complaints subsumed under the term “Gulf War Illnesses.” For a strong 
case can be made--based on unclassified data--for the following sequence. At least some intelligence 
analysts were clearly aware of the presence of chemical warfare assets at Khamisiyah before the Gulf 
War. However, the interpretations of these analysts may not have been available to appropriate military 
operational decision makers during the war and its immediate and intermediate aftermath. If the 
interpretations had been available, the decision makers might not have decided to order the intentional 
demolition of a bunker’s and pit’s contents at Khamisiyah by US military personnel--at least at close 
range. Or the decision makers might have decided to attempt to significantly warn US and Allied 
personnel judged at risk for possible CW agent dispersal--before, during, and after demolition--based on 
the best expert knowledge at the time. And, perhaps, just perhaps, there might today be a smaller 
number of veterans with Gulf War illnesses--even though there do not seem to be “smoking gun” data 
that exposure to low-level amounts of CW result in medical problems. 
 
Assuming the strong case to be the case, what went wrong? A number of factors intrinsic to intelligence 
analysis were explicitly cited as culpatory within Walpole’s report. However, these factors have been 
inappropriately seized upon and misinterpreted in screeds written by well-meaning but misguided 
commentators and observers. 
 
Multiple Data Bases. Question: Why were there multiple data bases on a specific topic, e.g., what was 
stored at Khamisiyah? If there was only one database, there would be less chance to overlook or lose 
information. Answer: Sure, but look at this from a philosopher’s, a cognitive psychologist’s, even an 
intelligence analysis manager’s point of view. Out there or in here, without or within, there are infinite 
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types and varieties of stimuli, some more important than others to a particular observer. The stimuli 
judged more important often are the ones not only sensed but perceived, categorized, and employed as 
concepts to which other stimuli are linked. In contrast, other stimuli judged less important are minimally 
or not even perceived, let alone categorized and linked. If there was a different database for each 
stimulus--important or not, and each database contained only what was uniquely characteristic of that 
stimulus, there would be an infinite amount of data bases, with little in each. If each database contained 
relevant but non-unique characteristics of a specific stimulus, there would be more information per 
database, but some overlap between them as well. So how many databases are needed, and how much 
should be in them? 
 
An intelligence analysis manager knowingly or otherwise deals with the above Issues within the more 
mundane context of being tasked to maintain databases on certain topics, not on others. But sometimes 
the “others” are what turns out to be of crucial importance in a political crisis. Although the manager 
has some leeway on what data bases are to be maintained and on rules of content inclusion and 
exclusion, the “others” of vital import in a crisis may not comprise the names of existing data bases but 
may comprise the content of some of them. Fortunately, information technologies can facilitate data 
searches after a “must-be-done-yesterday” request from political authorities, because the existence of 
multiple data bases are a fact of life, not a smoking gun of incompetence. (And there are still other 
Issues about requiring multiple data bases to manage information with different levels of security and 
code word classifications. We now turn to this topic.) 
 
Limited Sharing of Vital Information. Question: Why was information so zealously hoarded and guarded? 
If this weren’t so, the people who really need it, e.g., military operators in the field, could get it. Answer: 
Sure. But some information needs to be limited to protect sources of information and to avoid noxious 
consequences if the wrong people had information access. Sometimes--and this does not seem to 
include Khamisiyah--what looks like a tactical blunder of information limitation may well be a tactical or 
strategic success in information management, perception management, or information warfare. On the 
other hand, sometimes information is inappropriately guarded not for national security reasons but to 
avoid embarrassment--or the two are conflated. At other times, information is guarded to engage in the 
mischief described in the opening paragraph. The very real fact that limited sharing can be abused does 
not necessarily render limitation or even abuse as an intelligence failure. (And there is the hoary Issue 
that the same people who protest controlling information that may affect the security of large numbers 
of people zealously control the sordid details of their personal lives, which usually affect only 
themselves and a few others.) 
 
Incomplete Searches of Files. Question: Why weren’t all files searched right away? If this had been done, 
then all information would have been obtained. Answer: Sounds reasonable. But just as the devil is in 
the details, the problem is in the nature of searching. For example, an order may come down mandating 
a complete search of files for a particular Issue. (Hopefully, orders do not often come down mandating 
an incomplete search.) Unfortunately, there will almost always be information about the Issue in files 
not labeled with the Issue as subject. (See Multiple Databases above.) In fact, information about the 
Issue may not even contain the name of the Issue. Instead, this information may comprise data that, 
only when interpreted in a certain manner, will even bear on the Issue. While the term “incomplete 
search” often connotes locking up the smoking guns where no one can find them--or better yet, 
destroying the guns altogether--the heart of the matter is that often there are no smoking guns or 
merely guns that look like plowshares. 
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Analytic Errors. Yes, there seem to have been analytic errors--e.g., assuming that the Khamisiyah locale 
was An Nasiriyah instead or that, because S-shaped bunkers in Iraq often were associated with the 
presence of CW assets, the absence of such bunkers indicated as well the absence of CW assets. And 
there were other errors as well. 
 
But with so many contaminants that go with the territory of intelligence analysis, the question is not 
why there were errors but why there weren’t more. The following contaminants were cited or can be 
inferred from Walpole’s report: (1) Information confronting an analyst is almost always contradictory, 
ambiguous, and incomplete--and there are huge amounts of such information. (2) Analysts rarely have 
access to all information within their government’s information management system about a particular 
subject. (3) Resource constraints and conflicting intelligence and personal priorities limit the number of 
intelligence Issues that can be addressed in depth. (4) The public release of relevant information can 
shape conscious and unconscious expectations and biases of analysts. For example, the presence of false 
alarms about CW storage and employment can affect analyst opinions about the likelihood of future 
true alarms. (5) Different intelligence analysts manifest different cognitive thresholds about what 
constitutes “suspected” or “known” CW facilities. (6) A target of interest is often labeled and relabeled 
with different names with different spellings at different times by different analysts and other sources. 
For example, Khamisiyah was frequently referred to as Tall al Lahm. Also, some Iraqi CW assets may 
have been specially marked or unmarked either through policy dictates or the vagaries of human 
factors. (7) The target of interest is often labeled and relabeled with different functional classifications 
at different times. For example, Khamisiyah was sometimes classified as a conventional ammunition 
depot. (8) Often there are differences in categorization and classification procedures and in procedures 
for limiting and sharing among different agencies--sometimes within the same agency--within the IC. For 
example, the same facility was maintained in a National Security Agency database as Khamisiyah and in 
an imagery database as Tall al Lahm. Also, there are similar and different uses of similar and different 
words--e.g., a list of CW sites may not be the same as a list of CW facilities. (9) The credibility of human 
sources and the reliability and validity of technical and physical sources of information vary and often 
are misperceived or unknown. 
 
As of this writing, there is significant controversy about whether the IC in general and the Central 
Intelligence Agency specifically provided suitable and timely warnings about CW assets at Khamisiyah. 
CIA authorities especially seem to be stating that there were ample warnings before, during, and after 
the war about CW assets in the vicinity of Khamisiyah--although the Khamisiyah facility itself was not on 
a list of possible CW sites. In fact, nine days before the Khamisiyah demolition, there even seems to have 
been a CIA report to US Central Command authorities with map coordinates for a possible chemical 
storage area that was in fact the Khamisiyah depot--even though the depot was not mentioned by 
name. In any case, the Khamisiyah story is still incomplete, as is the understanding of intelligence 
analysis by some political authorities and informed citizens alike. (See Berkowitz, B.D. (Winter, 1997.) 
Information technology and intelligence reform. Orbis, 4, 107-118; Johnson, L. (Fall, 1983.) Seven sins of 
strategic intelligence. World Affairs, 146, 176-204; Shenon, P. (April 17, 1977.) CIA unfairly blamed in 
chemical blast, panel told. The New York Times, (http://www.nytimes.com)). (Keywords: Intelligence, 
Information Warfare, Perception Management.) 
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